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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs 
SANDRA SPRY, aka SANDRA 
CHLOPITSKY, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20000244-CA 
Priority No. 10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This appeal presents questions of law which must be decided 
for correctness. The "broad discretion" repeatedly cited by the 
State is not present. No record of oral arguments is necessary to 
determine whether the discretion was exercised properly, as the 
trial court made legal decisions in which it had no such 
discretion. 
Neither the decision of the trial court to deny Plaintiff 
necessary discovery, nor the decision of the trial court to grant 
inappropriate discovery to the State, were based on particularized 
fact which justified the use of its discretion. Both decisions 
were made without proffers or findings of fact; and both decisions 
violated Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THIS INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL RAISES QUESTIONS OF LAW ONLY; AND A 
TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENTS IS UNNECESSARY. 
Appellee, in its Brief, argues that the record on appeal is 
inadequate. The State suggests that the legal issues herein are a 
matter of broad discretion, available to the Judge, based on the 
evidence or circumstances. The State then suggests that the 
failure by Defendant to prepare a transcript of the record to 
submit to the Court prevents the Court from fully reviewing the 
matters at issue. That would, of course, be true if an evidentiary 
hearing had been held. In fact, the matter was addressed on 
written motions in brief oral arguments. No proffers were made; 
and no facts were found. Plaintiff simply represented that a 
statement had been made by Defendant in conjunction with an 
internal affairs complaint against the Officer who arrested her. 
The State simply suggested that it was none of their concern 
whether such a statement existed. The Court agreed with the State. 
In order to do so, however, the Court had to misread Rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows discovery of all 
written or recorded statement of the Defendant. 
Plaintiff may also have had an argument on relevancy, if it 
had presented the recorded statement to the Court to review in 
camera. That way, the Court could have determined facts, and 
assessed relevancy. The Court did not do so. It simply stated 
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that any recorded statement given by Defendant in conjunction with 
her internal affairs complaint would not be relevant to the 
criminal prosecution, even though the statement and the prosecution 
concerned the same event. That is error as a matter of law; and it 
does not suggest factual findings which this Court should review. 
It is unnecessary for an Appellate Court which decides questions of 
law based on a standard of correctness, to review oral arguments on 
a motion. The Motion was set forth in written pleadings; and the 
legal basis is clear. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE "BROAD DISCRETION" TO DENY DEFENDANT'S 
DISCOVERY REQUEST. 
The State, in Point II of its Brief, defends, at some 
length, the "broad discretion" of the Court in granting discovery 
requests in criminal matters. This is an error of law. Rule 16 
clearly provides that all statements made by Defendant to law 
enforcement officials investigating the case are discoverable. 
The investigating officer in this case was the object of 
Defendant's complaint. The investigating officer, the very 
person who will be at counsel table with the prosecution at 
trial, has obtained a copy of the statement, necessary for his 
defense against the complaint. It is absurd to suggest that he 
will use it only for his defense, and not to assist in the 
prosecution of Defendant, if he should see it as appropriate. 
There is no way he can flush from his mind any information he may 
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have gleaned from that statement, as he prepares to assist the 
prosecutor in presentation of the case against Defendant. Maybe 
the statement will not do Defendant a great deal of good. That, 
obviously, is not the point. Defendant gave information to the 
very people who are prosecuting her. She is entitled to review that 
information as she defends herself against their allegations. The 
nature and content of the statements must be reviewed by her 
attorney before any determination can be made regarding their 
reliability, value and relevancy. The rules do not provide for 
copies of statements only after a review as to their content and 
relevancy. To do that would require an extra hearing regarding 
discovery before every criminal proceeding. That is not what the 
rules have anticipated. 
Regarding the availability of the records, the State argues: 
Apparently, South Salt Lake City has sole custody of the 
disputed records. See Br. of Aplt. at 6. The record contains 
no indication that the Prosecutor, the Prosecutor's staff, or 
the investigating officers have seen or know the content of 
the requested records. 
Obviously the investigating officer has seen and does know the 
content of the complaint against him. Whether the Prosecutor has 
the records is not important or relevant. When a City police 
officer arrests someone, those arrest records are always in 
possession of the City until they are turned over to the State for 
prosecution. If records necessary for the prosecution are not 
turned over, the Prosecutor obviously has to ask for them. If the 
Prosecutor fails to do so, the prosecution will not go forward. 
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Defendant asserts that these records are necessary for the 
prosecution to go forward in a fair and equitable manner, in 
accordance with the rules. If the Prosecutor does not wish to get 
the records from the City as it always does, it can dismiss the 
charges. This is one area where "broad discretion" obviously does 
exist. One must wonder what important subject matter may be in the 
statement at issue in order to generate the level of resistance 
which this request has generated. Regardless of the content, 
however, this is not a matter of discretion. The material is 
discoverable; and it must be supplied. 
POINT III 
THE GRANT OF BLANKET DISCOVERY TO THE STATE BY THE TRIAL JUDGE 
WAS NOT A PROPER EXERCISE OF DISCRETION. 
The State, in dealing with the broad grant of discovery made 
by the trial Judge to the State in this matter, continues to argue 
"broad discretion". Once again, there were no factual findings by 
the Court justifying this unusual level of discovery against 
Defendant. The rule is clear in requiring good cause. The trial 
court was almost flippant in its opinion "that it is good cause 
that Plaintiff's counsel is able to be prepared, to be ready to 
make a presentation, and to get to the truth. No additional showing 
of good cause is necessary." (R.71). Once again, there were no 
facts determined at oral arguments in this matter which 
necessitated this discovery. This counsel has, in a defense 
practice over twenty-six years, never seen a discovery order like 
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this, in a criminal matter. The State did not suggest reasons for 
its discovery request. It simply just asked for everything. Once 
again, if the Court had made Findings of Fact, they would be in the 
record. The Court deliberately chose not to do so, ruling, as a 
matter of law, that such facts were not necessary. It is that 
ruling which is in error. It is not an exercise of "broad 
discretion". It is a judicial change in the law, a law which has 
been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court through its constitutional 
powers to regulate the practice of law. As previously pointed out 
in Appellant's main brief, lengthy discussions took place in a 
committee authorized by the Utah Supreme Court to explore changes 
in the rules; and those discussions resulted in no such changes. 
Realizing that this was significant to the success of its case, the 
State unsuccessfully moved to strike that material from Addendum C 
of Defendant's Brief in this matter. The records of that committee 
speak for themselves. The trial Judge in this matter cannot do 
what the Supreme Court Advisory Committee refused to do. The trial 
Court could have, if it so chose, held a hearing, found facts and 
determined "good cause". It could have then required specific 
discovery to be granted to the State, in this matter. This is not 
what was done. The Court is free, on remand, to decide the level 
of discovery necessary in this specific case, after entering 
Findings of Fact. Such a determination would constitute broad 
discretion which this Court would not normally overturn. The State 
has its remedy. It should be pursued as allowed by the rules. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial Court should be reversed, and Defendant should be 
given relief as requested in her previous brief. 
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